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Gender Equality in Virtual Work II.: 
 Regulatory Suggestions
Erika Kovács
This article focuses on gender equality in virtual work, taking special account of the regulatory 
challenges. It contributes to broader debates on the workers’ situation in the sharing economy in two 
ways. Firstly, it makes an inaugural attempt to evaluate the implications of the new forms of work in 
the sharing economy for female virtual workers, looking at the issue of equal treatment. Secondly, it 
offers preliminary suggestions regarding a future regulation to improve equality between genders in 
virtual work. 
This is the second part of a paper on gender equality in virtual work. The first part (published in 
the 2018/1 issue of the Hungarian Labour Law E-Journal) defined ‘virtual work’, classified its two 
basic forms and emphasised the specific traits of this form of work to demonstrate the need of special 
protection against discrimination. Subsequently, it identified the possible beneficial and adverse 
implications of virtual work for female workers and gender equality. 
This second part firstly provides a summary of the gender equality law of the European Union 
that serves as a point of reference when speaking about antidiscrimination law. Section 2 offers three 
normative perspectives and suggestions as to how to enhance gender equality in virtual work. Finally, 
the paper concludes.
*  Assistant Professor, Department of Business Law, Labour and Social Security Law at the Vienna University of Economics and 
Business, Austria. Email: erika.kovacs@wu.ac.at. I am grateful to Miriam Kullmann and Rebecca Zahn for providing invaluable 
comments on an earlier draft of this article. All errors are my own.
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1. Gender Equality Law of the European Union as a Point of Reference
1.1. The regulatory framework 
This part addresses the question whether the European Union law can give any guidance on how 
to support gender equality in virtual work. Even if this question will be probably answered in the 
negative, the paper makes use of the EU rules and terminology as a point of reference. The paper 
applies the term ‘equal treatment of men and women’ to virtual workers in the sense as understood in 
the European Union law. 
The European Union law declared the principle of equal pay for male and female workers for equal 
work or work of equal value already in the Treaty of Rome in 1957 (now Art. 157 TFEU).1 This rule 
has a broad personal scope due to the autonomous European definition of ‘worker’, which covers all 
those persons who provide services during a given time for and under the direction of another in 
return for remuneration.2 This is a much broader definition than the usual national understandings of 
an employee and could easily cover a significant part of virtual workers. 
In addition, EU law regulates the principle of equal treatment between men and women in three 
Directives. The Directive 2006/54/EC3 addresses the matters of employment and occupation, Directive 
2010/41/EU4 applies to persons engaged in an activity in a self-employed capacity and Directive 
2004/113/EC5 deals with the access to and supply of goods and services. The respective Directives 
differentiate between direct and indirect discrimination as the two major forms of discrimination. 
‘Direct discrimination’ materialises in an adverse treatment on grounds of sex, whereby it needs 
a (hypothetical) person in comparable situation. ‘Indirect discrimination’ means an apparently 
neutral provision, criterion or practice that “would put persons of one sex at a particular disadvantage 
compared with persons of the other sex, unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively 
justified by a legitimate aim, and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary”6 
For both categories, it is indifferent, whether discrimination is intentional or not. What matters is 
that a measure treats the person adversely eventually. Therefore, this paper does not address the 
question, whether discrimination in virtual work is intentional. Furthermore, all three Directives 
equate harassment and sexual harassment with discrimination. The Directive 2006/54/EC regarding 
1  Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2012/C 326/01.
2  Established case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union since its judgment Lawrie-Blum of 3.7.1986, C-66/85.
3  Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal 
opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast).
4  Directive 2010/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2010 on the application of the principle of equal 
treatment between men and women engaged in an activity in a self-employed capacity and repealing Council Directive 86/613/
EEC.
5  Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in 
the access to and supply of goods and services.
6  Art. 2 b) Directive 2004/113/EC; Article 2 (1) b) Directive 2006/54/EC; Article 3 b) Directive 2010/41/EU.
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employment and occupation declares also the instruction to discriminate against persons on grounds 
of sex as a form of discrimination.7
In case of virtual work, the two major forms of discrimination, namely direct and indirect 
discrimination are relevant. Bad ratings based on gender constitute direct discrimination, if a woman 
receives worse rating based on gender than a man would have who made a comparable performance of 
work. Hence, in the relationship between client and worker, gender-related differences in the evaluation 
of work performance are directly discriminatory. On the other hand, if platform-based companies use 
discriminatory ratings for the supervision of workers and making managerial decisions, this practice 
implies indirect discrimination. Ratings can be seen as apparently neutral criterion of workers’ 
evaluation, which ultimately disadvantage women. Therefore, in the relation between platform-based 
company and worker, the use of ratings can result in indirect discrimination of workers. 
1.2. The Personal Scope of Gender Equality Law in the EU
As Countouris and Freedland emphasise, in most EU Member States the personal scope of gender 
equality law is limited to a narrow concept of employees, while a large percentage of the labour 
market participants are excluded from this protection.8 They criticise the exclusion of those economic 
actors who are clients or customers from the scope of gender equality law and call for the expansion 
of gender equality law beyond the narrow scope of employment.
The equality law of the European Union first focused on ‘workers’ as a consequence of the 
ancillary nature of this right to the guarantee of the free movement of workers. The development 
of anti-discrimination law in its own brought about a cautious extension of its scope beyond the 
employment relationship. Most explicitly, Article 14 (1) a) of the Directive 2006/54/EC prohibits direct 
or indirect discrimination on grounds of sex in relation to conditions for access to employment, to 
self-employment or to occupation, including selection criteria, recruitment conditions, and promotion. 
Here, the anti-discrimination rule applies to self-employed only regarding access to the assignment. 
Any further steps of the work performance, ie. the exercise of the activity, is not protected against 
discriminatory behaviour of the service recipients.9 
Even the comprehensive German commentary literature confesses that the question, how far 
Article 14 of the Directive covers self-employed persons is not completely explained.10 Particularly the 
7  Art. 2 (2) b) of Directive 2006/54/EC on equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation.
8  N. Countouris – M. Freedland: ‘Work’, ‘Self-Employment’, and Other Personal Work Relations: Who Should be Protected 
against Sex Discrimination in Europe. European Gender Equality Law Review, 2013/2. 15., 18.
9  Catherine Barnard – Alysia Blackham: Discrimination and the Self-Employed – The Scope of Protection in an Interconnected 
Age. In: Hugh Collins (ed.): European Contract Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 2017. 206.
10  Jochen Mohr: RL 2006/54/EG Article 2. In: Martin Franzen – Inken Gallner – Hartmut Oetker (eds.): Kommentar zum 
europäischen Arbeitsrecht. 2016. 1699., 1712.
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Danosa judgment11 of the Court of Justice of the EU brought ambiguity, in which the Court required 
the protection of a pregnant woman independently from her legal status. The protection against 
dismissal granted to pregnant women under EU law cannot depend on the formal categorisation of 
their employment relationship under national law.12 Even so, the Court has not required in general 
the extension of the personal scope of anti-discrimination rules to self-employed persons, but limited 
its statement to the protection of all working pregnant women against dismissal based on pregnancy. 
One should keep in mind, that Directive 2006/56/EC applies the broad definition of worker, which 
could cover part of the virtual workers. However, the Court of Justice of the EU made early clear 
in the Allonby judgment that an employee and a self-employed person, who provide services to the 
same employer are not in a comparable situation.13 The Allonby judgment had actually two messages. 
First, it stated, that self-employed persons are not covered by the equal pay principle of the Directive 
2006/54/EC. Second, it clarified that a differentiation among self-employed people is possible and the 
invoked principle applies to those self-employed, who are mainly dependent on one particular client.14
The EU Directive 2010/41 extended the application of the principle of equal treatment to self-employed 
men and women to some extent. Article 2 a) of Directive 2010/41/EU defines self-employed as “all 
persons pursuing a gainful activity for their own account, under the conditions laid down by national 
law” leaving much space for specification to the Member States.15 This can result in different personal 
scope of protection throughout the Member States. Article 4(1) of the Directive prohibits discrimination 
on grounds of sex in the public or private sectors, “in relation to the establishment, equipment or 
extension of a business or the launching or extension of any other form of self-employed activity.” This 
rule is not to overrate, as it aims rather at just boosting female self-employment and so it applies the 
equal treatment principle to the initial access to self-employment, but not to the actual exercise of the 
activity.16 In this context, Barnard and Blackham call attention to the pitfalls of the distinction between 
access and exercise of self-employment. They criticise the fact that self-employed as service provider 
cannot invoke the Directives to challenge discriminatory decisions made by potential users/clients.17 
This means, that virtual workers cannot invoke EU equality rules, if they have not been selected for an 
assignment based on their sex or are payed worse than comparable men are.
11  The dispute affected the protection against the dismissal of a member of a capital company’s board of directors CJEU 11.11.2010, 
Danosa, C-232/09, par 57–69.
12  Ibid. par 69.
13  See the CJEU’s restrictive interpretation of the application of the equal payment principle of Art. 157 TFEU on self-employed in: 
CJEU, 13.01.2004, C-256/01 Allonby v. Accrington & Rosendale College, ECLI:EU:C:2004:18, para. 42–50. 
14  Ibid. par. 71.
15  On the different legal solutions of the Member States see: C. Barnard – A. Blackham: Self-Employment in EU Member States: 
The Role for Equality Law. European Commission. European Equality Law Review, 2015/2. 8–10.
16  Ibid. 7.
17  Ibid. 9–10.
http://www.hllj.hu
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Of special interest is Directive 2004/113/EC, which lays down a framework for combating 
discrimination based on sex in access to and supply of goods and services. According to Article 3 sec 
1, “this Directive shall apply to all persons who provide goods and services, which are available to 
the public […] and which are offered outside the area of private and family life and the transactions 
carried out in this context.” Section 2 further specifies that “this Directive does not prejudice the 
individual’s freedom to choose a contractual partner as long as an individual’s choice of contractual 
partner is not based on that person’s sex.” This indicates a broad personal scope of protection, which 
also includes the exercise of self-employed activities of virtual workers.18 
Consequently, selection of the service provider based on a specific gender is prohibited. However, 
this rule raises uncertainties regarding enforcement, starting with the difficulty to identify potential 
clients, who made their decision not to choose specific workers due to their gender. Another uncertainty 
is attached to the fact that the Directive does not cover service offered within the area of private and 
family life. The application of the equal treatment principle stops at the border of private sphere. 
This could lead to the exclusion of a great part of virtual work from the equal treatment principle. 
The Preamble of the Directive is instructive, as it mentions the right to equality and the protection 
of private and family life in succession.19 It emphasises that while prohibiting discrimination, it is 
important to respect fundamental rights and freedoms, including transactions carried out in the 
private sphere. However, this privacy exception should be understood narrowly and be restricted to 
cases, where clients for performance of work in family settings select the worker.20 
Barnard and Blackham speaks for the application of the equality principle to all public offerings 
of services with one exception. They argue that in a narrow field, if the service recipients take a 
decision in private, domestic context, the privacy interest has priority over the equality principle.21 
Consequently, EU equality law does not and should not apply to clients/users purchasing service in 
their home. According to this argument, clients should be allowed to discriminate against virtual 
workers in all those cases, when the service provision mainly occurs in the domestic sphere. 
Barnard and Blackham draw the line of this principle at services provided in a commercial context. 
Clients acting in the public, as business, cannot discriminate in recruitment. This balance of equality 
law and private autonomy is to approve at theoretical level, but features two major deficiencies in the 
context of platform work. First, this argument legitimizes discriminatory behaviour only regarding 
the assignment of a job, but not as to the job performance. This means that service recipients can 
refuse virtual workers based on gender, but should not be allowed to rate female workers worse than 
men based on their gender. Service provision in family settings cannot justify discrimination during 
or after performing the service. 
18  Ibid. 10–11.
19  Points 2 and 3 of the Preamble of the Directive 2004/113/EC.
20  In line with the arguments of Barnard–Blackham (2017) op. cit. 214–215.
21  Barnard–Blackham (2017) op. cit. 213–215.
http://www.hllj.hu
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Second, most importantly, it does not solve the problem of discrimination of virtual workers due 
to the difficulty to separate the discriminatory act of clients from those of the platform. Usually, 
decisions taken are a mixture of clients’ and platforms’ behaviours. According to Barnard’s and 
Blackham’s logic, platforms, which act in public, should observe equality law. This leads back to the 
problem, whether the platform or the clients make discriminatory decisions. In my mind, labour-based 
platforms are mostly responsible for making decisions on payment and other terms and conditions, 
even if clients have influence on them, as well. 
Summarised, we can conclude that the EU law contains clear rules on gender equality only 
regarding non-discriminatory access to labour market opportunities. Following this legal regime, 
most EU Member States prohibit discrimination against self-employed only regarding access to any 
employment. Remarkably, a few EU countries expressly extended this protection to the conclusion of 
contracts between the self-employed and the service recipients.22 A couple of countries also contain 
protection against discriminatory terminations of self-employment contracts, which can be seen as 
complementary to the protection of non-discriminatory access to contracts for services.23 This practise 
is rather the exception, though. The situation is more complicated due to the privacy exception, which 
allows neglecting the equal treatment principle for services offered in private sphere. It is still unsure, 
what exactly this exception means for the practice.
2. Regulatory Suggestions
2.1. Extension of the Equal Treatment Principle to Self-Employed
2.1.1. Detachment of Equality Law From Labour Law
The integration of virtual workers into labour law evidently brings about the benefit to apply the 
principle of equal treatment of men and women to virtual workers. In the European labour law 
systems, this principle is generally accepted, but its application depends on the person’s labour law 
qualification. The personal scope of equality law is often limited to persons qualified as employees 
or employee-like persons. The equal treatment of men and women beyond the scope of labour law is 
much more controversial and severely limited by the consideration of other interests. However, the 
classification of virtual workers as employees or workers or even as persons belonging to the third 
category is associated with difficulties.
22  N. Countouris – M. Freedland: The Personal Scope of the EU Sex Equality Directives. European Commission, 2012. 4.
23  Countouris–Freedland (2013) op. cit. 17.
http://www.hllj.hu
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Having in mind the goal of equal treatment of men and women, this principle should be detached 
from the employment status and extended to self-employed persons. This claim is very near to 
Fredman’s idea who advocates for ‘freestanding social rights’ independent from the employment 
relationship, alleging that treating employment relationship as a privilege is in itself discriminatory.24 
The drawback of the rigid binary division of labour law is that everybody who does not fulfil the 
requirements of being qualified as an employee necessarily falls into the category of self-employed 
and as such, falls outside any labour law protection. This had been particularly detrimental to women 
for a long time.25 As Fredman points out, the narrow scope of employment, the difficulty to define 
employee and employer, and the aim to avoid the insider/outsider division clearly speak for the 
extension of social rights beyond the scope of employment relationship. 
Fredman raised the question in the title of her excellent article on the relationship and interaction 
between equality law and labour law in the UK,26 whether equality law is part of labour law or an 
autonomous field. I think it is necessary to raise the same question in the context of the equal treatment 
regulation of virtual workers. As she emphasises, the right to equal treatment is a human right and 
as such must not be restricted to employees (or workers), but has to be extended to all persons who 
perform work in person as virtual workers do.27 The Directive 2004/113/EC acknowledges the right to 
“protection against discrimination for all persons” as a universal right recognised in many universal 
and European human right documents.28 This human right approach helps to overcome the limited 
scope of the labour law protection.
In addition, as Fredman puts it, discrimination is an act of power, so it assumes a power relationship 
irrespective of the legal qualification of the relationship. Platform-based companies and workers are in 
a hierarchical relationship due to asymmetries of information and the companies’ authority to dispose 
of the fate of the relationship.29 Since platforms are in a powerful position, it is only appropriate to 
place the duty on them not to discriminate against their workers. In my opinion, the criterion of having 
a ‘power relationship’ creates a lower hurdle than the labour law condition of personal dependency 
and is more appropriate to constitute the basis for the application of the equal treatment principle. 
24  S. Fredman: Women at Work: The Broken Promise of Flexicurity. Ind. L. J., Vol. 33., No. 4. (2004) 299–319.
25  S. Fredman – J. Fudge: The Legal Construction of Personal Work Relations and Gender. Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies, Vol 
7., No. 1. (2013) 112.
26  S. Fredman: Equality Law: Labour Law or an Autonomous Field? In: A. Bogg – C. Costello – A. C. L. Davies – J. Prassl: The 
Autonomy of Labour Law. Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2015. 257–273.
27  Ibid. 258–259.
28  Point 2 of the Preamble of the Directive 2004/113/EC.
29  R. Calo – A. Rosenblat: The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and Power. Colum. L. Rev., Vol. 117., 2017. 1623.
http://www.hllj.hu
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2.1.2. Extension of Equality Law to Self-Employed
My strong suggestion is to adopt an inclusive approach and extend equality law to self-employed. 
Alternatively, the option is also conceivable that only those self-employed should fall under the scope 
of equality law, whose situation is most similar to that of the workers. For the specification of this 
group, two features are decisive. First, certain countries already differentiate between categories of 
self-employed based on the fact that some self-employed work mainly for one particular client or for a 
few of them.30 This fact indicates that these self-employed are usually economically dependent on the 
single or a few clients. Another feature for the differentiation is, whether self-employed employ other 
workers, or perform work as a solo self-employed. Self-employed without own workforce often show 
a greater resemblance to those protected by labour law than to self-employed with own workers.31 In 
my opinion, these two classifications are instructive from the perspective of equality to identify self-
employed persons in virtual work who are in need of protection. I suggest that equality law should 
cover at least those solo self-employed, who perform work for one or a few platform companies. 
The material scope of the equal treatment principle should cover engagement (acquiring an 
assignment), terms and conditions of work (providing it, paying for it, rating it, contacting to the 
platform and to the client), and termination. Equal opportunity to access to a platform and to become 
a worker usually does not seem to be problematic; women can participate in virtual work. Most 
difficult is to guarantee the equal treatment principle regarding terms and conditions of work. Two 
major issues stare the observer in the face, namely discrimination through ratings and wage gap. As 
ratings determine virtual workers’ basic rights such as the probability to get new assignments, wage 
level and promotion, any discrimination at this point multiplies. Therefore, it is major issue to draw 
on this finding and fight against biased ratings by the extension of the equal treatment principle to the 
terms and conditions of the work performance.  
2.1.3. Consideration of Privacy and Personal Preferences
Opponents of the expansion of the equal treatment principle to self-employed persons could argue that 
the adoption of the equal treatment principle to the realm of civil law relationships excessively limits 
the autonomy of the parties as well as the freedom of contract. Autonomy and privacy can call for 
allowing clients’ discriminatory preferences by law.32 
30  C. Barnard – A. Blackham: Self-Employed – The implementation of Directive 2010/41 on the application of the principle of equal 
treatment between men and women engaged in an activity in a self-employed capacity. European Commission, 2015. 3–4.
31  To the distinction see J. Fudge: Self-employment, Women, and Precarious Work: The Scope of Labour Protection. In: J. Fudge – 
R. Owens (eds.): Precarious Work, Women, and the New Economy. Hart Publishing, 2006. 209–211.
32  K. T. Bartlett – M. Gulati: Discrimination by Customers. Iowa L. Rev., Vol. 102. N. 223. 2016. 238–241.
http://www.hllj.hu
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The challenge is to consider and weigh the equal treatment principle against private autonomy and 
interests in privacy,33 without falling into the trap of a sharp dichotomy between family as private 
(intimate) sphere and market as commercial (public) sphere.34 The sharing economy very often 
includes “intimate transactions,”35 since the place of service provision is often the home of the client 
(in cases of work on-demand) or the worker (crowdworker). However, excluding virtual work from 
the scope of equality law with the argument that the work is performed at the workers’ or clients’ 
home would just put the long debate of the false dichotomy of private and public work in a new light. 
Fudge and Owens pointed out that the separated regulation of home as private sphere from the market 
as public sphere put an everlasting burden on women.36 Eventually, the legislator has to weigh the 
different competing values and set priorities.37 The presented opinion of Barnard and Blackham on the 
limited scope of equality law presents one possible solution with certain weak points for virtual work.
The trouble regarding the application of the equal right principle in the context of private relationships 
between clients/users and service providers cannot be denied. Service searchers are usually free to 
choose between service providers. Their choice is based on preferences, which can disadvantage 
male or female service providers. Obviously, not all preferences create a discrimination. If women 
prefer female gynaecologists or female divorce lawyers in the hope that they understand them better, 
these preferences in the choice do not discriminate against men.38 One could easily bring similar 
arguments, why a woman is preferred for babysitting or a man is selected for certain handyman 
activities. The selection criterion is in both cases the assumption that representatives of a certain 
gender have better soft or hard skills needed for the job concerned. This is, of course, not always 
the case. The point is, in my opinion, that even if we accept the clients’ freedom to select a service 
provider based on gender for the performance of a work within the private sphere, this biased choice 
is limited to the assignment of the work. Arguments such as private life, autonomy and freedom do 
not justify discriminatory behaviour once the worker has been engaged. This means that clients are 
not allowed to treat virtual workers discriminatory as to their working conditions, i.e. ratings, paying, 
etc. The arguments of intimacy and privacy cannot legitimize discriminatory ratings, algorithms and 
other terms and conditions of virtual work.
33  N. Schoenbaum: Gender and the Sharing Economy. Fordham Urban Law Journal, Vol. 43., N. 4. (2016) 42–46.
34  This distinction criticised by, e.g.: F. E. Olsen: The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform. Harv. L. Rev., 
Vol. 96, No. 7 (May, 1983) 1497. 1499–1528.; D. L. Rhode: Justice and Gender – Sex Discrimination and the Law. Rev. ed. Harward 
University Press, 1991. 125–131.; Schoenbaum (2016) op. cit. 28.
35  Expression used by Schoenbaum, see Schoenbaum (2016) op. cit. 7.
36  J. Fudge – R. Owens: Precarious Work, Women, and the New Economy: The Challenge to Legal Norms. In: Fudge–Owens (eds., 
2006) op. cit. 3. 12–15., 21.
37  Bartlett–Gulati (2016) op. cit. 241.
38  Examples mentioned by Schoenbaum, see Schoenbaum (2016) op. cit. 14.
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2.2. Proactive and Transparent Equality Management of the Sharing Firms
Companies of the sharing economy should actively undertake measures to ensure that clients/users 
do not discriminate against workers, based on gender.39 In my opinion, platform-based companies 
have powerful instruments to thwart adverse treatment by setting their internal and external rules 
and by programming their algorithms. Platforms have the necessary information on workers’ profiles, 
rates and pay, and feedback scores, so they are in the best position to counteract discrimination.40 The 
precise database and monitoring system allow the companies to monitor clients/users regarding their 
potentially discriminatory behaviour and channel their behaviour. 
Several equality-enhancing instruments are conceivable. For example, Barzilay and Ben-David 
suggest that platforms should inform the workers of average hourly rates for certain tasks.41 This could 
contribute to the prevention of the previously mentioned phenomenon that women tend to require less 
money than men for the same job. Regarding bias in ratings, efficient instruments include the careful 
design of performance evaluation forms and the increase of the reporting burden by requiring the 
specific reasons for a low rating.42 Companies should provide transparent guidelines with the detailed 
aspects of the evaluation. 
The reduction of information on workers can be an appropriate method in cases where there is no or 
just little personal relationship between client/user and worker.43 While in the traditional labour market 
there has been a turn that job applicants are not required any more to attach a photo to their CVs or 
to disclose any personal information on their family life and personal preferences, similar concerns 
are rarely present in sharing economy. Quite the contrary seems to be true. Sharing economy firms 
urge workers to publish as much information on themselves as possible. This tendency, which also 
increases concerns for data protection, favours discriminatory behaviour. Therefore, a major proposal 
is to limit information on the workers available to the clients and thus reduce the opportunities for 
discrimination.44 The limitation of the provision of personal information seems to be an efficient tool 
to hinder discrimination. Schoenbaum criticized that this is only a short-term prophylactic measure, 
but does not go to the heart of antidiscrimination law and does not change biased attitudes.45 Changing 
the way, how individuals act, but not what they believe, may come too short considering the ultimate 
39  Bartlett–Gulati (2016) op. cit. 256.; Barnard–Blackham (2017) op. cit. 217.
40  A. R. Barzilay – A. Ben-David: Platform Inequality: Gender in the Gig-Economy. Seton Hall L. Rev., 2017. 430. National 
Employment Law Project, Policy Brief, June 2017, 5. http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/On-Demand-Anti-Discrimination-
Protections.pdf (last visited: 20.12.2017.).
41  Barzilay–Ben-David op. cit. 430.
42  A. Rosenblat – K. Levy – S. Barocas – T. Hwang: Discriminating Tastes: Customer Ratings as Vehicles for Bias. Intelligence 
and Autonomy, October 19, 2016. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2858946, 14.
43  Ibid.
44  As also suggested by Bartlett–Gulati (2016) op. cit. 251–252.
45  N. Schoenbaum: A Modest Proposal? Regulating Customer Discrimination Through the Firm. Iowa Law Review Online, Vol. 
102., 2017. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2977921, 107.
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goal of equality law. However, at least it helps preventing the individual against the damage caused by 
the discrimination. Therefore, even if it does not tackle the problem at its roots, it has a positive effect.
The identification of biased ratings is difficult, as evaluation has an inherent subjective content. 
The impact of personal preferences can be significantly reduced through clear and gender-neutral 
ratings criteria. Several scholars suggested the implementation of a statistical filtering technique in 
order to exclude discriminatory ratings.46 Although the specific design of such filtering criteria is 
debatable, mechanisms are certainly available for an effective protection against unfair ratings. The 
most accepted methods to make ratings bias-sensitive are to exclude or attribute lower weight to 
presumed discriminatory ratings or adjust the results of specific workers upwards if they belong to a 
group, which is systematically discriminated against.47
Additionally, the design and operation of algorithms should be made transparent. Transparency 
is the only way to prevent sharing economy firms from abusing their position of possessing much 
information and data on clients/users and workers. The clear asymmetry of data and information 
between the platform-based companies and the workers causes a massive risk of power abuse. This 
information asymmetry and the non-public function of algorithms hinder the application of the equal 
treatment principle.48 Transparency requires making the functions of algorithms accessible to state 
control. 
As Schoenbaum emphasises, a large part of virtual work occurs in the clients’/users’ or workers’ 
private places, which counteracts transparency and benefits biased preferences.49 Performing work 
at home or in public spaces in a private relationship enhances the chances for discrimination. The 
personal connection in the private sphere makes the relation between client/user and worker more prone 
to biased behaviour. To counteract this risk Rosenblat and her colleagues suggest the establishment 
and public disclosure of baseline statistics about ratings and workers’ demographic characteristics in 
the context of protected status.50 The private nature of choices in the rankings without the pressure 
to observe expected social norms benefit discriminating behaviour.51 Public disclosure of possible 
discriminatory ratings should bring about public pressure to change such practises.
46  C. Dellarocas: Immunizing Online Reputation Reporting Systems Against Unfair Ratings and Discriminatory Behavior. In: 
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. 2000. 150–157.; A. Whitby –A. Jøsang – J. Indulska: Filtering Out Unfair Ratings 
in Bayesian Reputation Systems, 2004 available: https://folk.uio.no/josang/papers/WJI2004-AAMAS.pdf; C. Dellarocas: 
Mechanisms for coping with unfair ratings and discriminatory behavior in online reputation reporting systems. In: ICIS ‘00 
Proceedings of the twenty-first international conference on Information systems. 2000. 520–525.
47  Whitby–Jøsang–Indulska op. cit. 2.; Rosenblat et al. op. cit. 13–14.; Hekman et al.: An Examination of Whether and How 
Racial and Gender Biases Influence Customer Satisfaction. Acad. Man. J., Vol. 53., No. 2., 258. 
48  Rosenblat et al. op. cit. 11.
49  Ibid. 5–13.
50  Ibid. 12–13.
51  Schoenbaum (2016) op. cit. 16.
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2.3. Liability of Labour-Based Platforms for Discriminatory Behaviour
Platform-based companies that provide labour as service should be made legally liable as duty holders 
for observing equal treatment of men and women.52 Sharing economy firms cannot only monitor 
whether service recipients treat workers adversely based on a gender bias by negatively rating or by 
rejecting female or male workers, but could also channel the behaviour of clients/users.53 
Stone correctly called attention to the fact that the diffuse authority structures and the delegation 
of managerial decisions to peer groups are not new phenomena, but render it difficult to identify 
discrimination and make the discriminator legally accountable.54 In my opinion, the subordinate 
position of the self-employed from the company constitutes the bases for holding liability. If the 
company can give orders to the self-employed person, it should be held liable in respect of the equal 
treatment principle. Algorithms of sharing companies are designed to take clients behaviour into 
account, which implicitly leads to bias.55 Clients/users participate in the management through the 
ratings, however, the decisions are made by platform-based companies. The platform company is 
responsible for setting up and running the software, so it is obviously in charge of the decisions 
made in its name. Algorithms actually make statistical discrimination real, when they make decisions 
based on assumptions how a man or women will behave because of their gender. Firms should be 
made responsible for considering customers’ possibly biased opinion in making decisions.56 While 
the discriminatory behaviour occurs by the clients, the platform should prevent it, and eventually 
should be liable for damages caused by clients/users to the workers. The companies’ desire to please 
their customers involves the consideration and fulfilment of customers’ discriminatory preferences.57 
Customers’ satisfaction, which often involves the approval of customers’ discrimination, makes 
profit for the companies.58 In my opinion, the only way to prevent profiting from the support of 
a discriminatory behaviour is to hold companies liable for discrimination and thus set financial 
incentives for non-discriminatory behaviour.
In my opinion, firms should be responsible both for the clients’ and the platforms’ discriminatory 
behaviour. First, platform-based companies facilitate discrimination by their clients through enabling 
52  On the debate of the identification of the duty holder in various European states, see: C. Barnard – A. Blackham: Self-Employment 
in EU Member States: The Role for Equality Law. European Commission, European Equality Law Review, 2015/2. 11. 
53  Calo – Rosenblat, op. cit. 1628.; Schoenbaum (2016) op. cit. 47.
54  K. V. W. Stone: The New Face of Employment Discrimination. In: Fudge–Owens (eds., 2006) op. cit. 243. 246–249.
55  Anikó Hannák – Claudia Wagner – David Garcia – Alan Mislove – Markus Strohmaier – Christo Wilson: Bias in Online 
Freelance Marketplaces: Evidence from TaskRabbit and Fiverr. Proceedings of the 20th ACM Conference on Computer-Supported 
Cooperative Work and Social Computing (CSCW 2017), Portland, OR, February, 2017. 1914.
56  Also Rosenblat et al. op. cit. 9.
57  Wang, supra note 40, at L. Wang: When the Customer is King: Employment Discrimination as Customer Service. Va. J. Soc. Pol’y 
& L., Vol. 23., N. 249. (2016) 253.
58  L. Fuller – V. Smith: Consumers’ Reports: Management by Customers in a Changing Economy. Work, Employment & Society, 
Vol. 5., No 1. 1991. 2.
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them to make discriminatory decisions in the selection, evaluation or payment of workers.59 Making 
firms liable for making discriminatory behaviour possible could mean a negligence liability.60 The 
introduction of a negligence liability to firms may be difficult in the US antidiscrimination law, which 
mainly covers intentional discrimination.61 However, as indicated earlier, this is not the case in the 
EU law, which focuses on the impact of a measure independently from its intention. The second form 
of responsibility concerns those measures and decisions the company make based on the clients’ 
biased behaviour. Any managerial decision resting upon discriminatory choices will perpetuate 
discrimination, but should not hide behind the veil of ignorance. Platform-based companies cannot 
argue that they have not known the discrimination in ratings of payment, as they have easy access to 
these data. 
The decision of the Court of Justice of the EU on Uber made easier to make platforms liable for 
discrimination of virtual workers in EU law context.62 The Court confirmed that the main component 
of this platform company is transport service and not pure information society service, since the 
service offered by Uber is more than an intermediation service. As arguments for this decision, 
the Court stated that Uber exerts decisive influence over the conditions under which that service is 
provided, for example, by determining the maximum fare. Furthermore, it exercises control over the 
quality of the vehicles, the drivers and their conduct.63 This decision implies that similar platform 
companies such as Uber determine significant terms and conditions of service provision and thus 
should be responsible for them.
This strong management and supervision of workers does not characterise all platform-based 
firms and can serve as an indication for the distinction between different kinds of firms. Some firms, 
particularly asset-based firms such as Airbnb use ratings only as an information provided for the 
consumers. To the contrary, many labour-based platform firms make use of the ratings as basis for 
management decisions.64 In reality, even labour-based platforms are different regarding the project 
governance.65 Some platforms just connect workers and clients, others also aggregate similar tasks, 
while others provide project governance, as well. The European Commission also differentiates in its 
Agenda between platforms that provide only information and platforms that provide an underlying 
service. The last version is realized, if the platform has significant influence and control over the 
59  See Bartlett–Gulati (2016) op. cit. 249. 
60  As noted by Schoenbaum, see Schoenbaum (2017) op. cit. 102–103.; GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 2017-50; 
GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2017-50. 
61  Schoenbaum mentions this drawback of the proposal, Schoenbaum (2017) op. cit. 103.
62  Court of Justice of the European Union, Asociación Profesional Élite Taxi v Uber Systems Spain SL, C-434/15, 20.12.2017.
63  Ibid. para. 35–40.
64  Rosenblat et al. op. cit. 9.
65  Kaganer et al differentiates between four types of platform: see E. Kaganer – E. Carmel – R. Hirscheim – T. Olsen: Managing 
the Human Cloud. MIT Sloan Management Rev., Vol. 54., No. 2., 2013. 23., 25–27. This categorization borrowed also Wilma B. 
Liebman – Andrew Lyubarsky: Crowdworkers, the Law and the Future of Work: The U.S. In: B. Waas – W. B. Liebman – A. 
Lyubarsky – K. Kezuka: Crowdwork – A Comparative Law Perspective. Frankfurt am Main, Bund Verlag, 2017. 58–78.
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actual service provider by setting the terms and conditions of the service provision.66 The point is, 
as long as the platform operates the discriminatory software it should be held liable for this practise.
3. Conclusion
The first part of this two-pieces paper provided a first evaluation of the implications of new forms of 
work in the sharing economy for women in general and gender equality more specifically. It called 
attention to the fact that the existing ratings systems and algorithms are a hotbed of discrimination. 
Here, we emphasised that platform-based companies should make the design of algorithms and 
platforms codes transparent, as well as provide a proactive equality management by using equality-
enhancing instruments. 
The uncertainties around the determination of the legal status of workers make it difficult and 
often impossible to provide appropriate protection against discrimination in the framework of labour 
law. Therefore, the article argues for going beyond the boundaries of labour law and suggests that 
the principle of equal treatment between men and women should be extended to virtual workers, 
independently from their labour law status. This extension is not unprecedented, but accompanied 
with privacy concerns. Service provided in the private sphere of the service recipients could constitute 
an exception from the equal treatment principle, but only regarding the assignment to a specific task. 
Privacy, intimacy or personal preferences cannot justify discriminatory treatment during or after the 
performance of the work through low ratings or low payment for gender or racial reasons.
Finally, platform-based companies should be made liable for facilitating the discriminatory behaviour 
of their clients against virtual workers through biased ratings. They should be also responsible for 
using biased ratings in the supervision and management of virtual workers. Both measures fulfil the 
European law definition of discrimination, which neglect the intention, but focuses on the impact of 
a decision or measure.
66  European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – A European agenda for the collaborative economy, Brussels, 2.6.2016, 
COM(2016) 356 final, 5–6.
